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0.1. ABSTRACT 
In 2013 Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin 
announced their readiness to renew the dialogue on the Kuril Islands – the disputed 
territory that kept the Japan-Russia bilateral relationship frozen for almost 70 years. Due 
to the territorial dispute, the Japan-Russia economic and diplomatic cooperation 
remained relatively underdeveloped, which provided a great opportunity for both to 
benefit from the improved bilateral cooperation. However, the breakthrough has never 
happened, since the Japan-Russia relationship deteriorated after Japan joined US 
sanctions against Russia due to Russian involvement in the Ukrainian Crisis. 
Conventional explanations cite that the United States pressured Japan into imposing 
sanctions against its national interest.  In this paper I provide an analysis of Japanese 
sanctions against Russia to answer the question of whether US pressure on Japan 
resulted in reactive Japan’s foreign policy sanctions against Russia.  
Therefore this paper will put forward a case to answer the question of whether Japan’s 
foreign policy was influenced by it being a reactive state. For the purpose of this 
research, I analysed the three rounds of sanctions from March 2014 to July 2016 by 
using a process tracing method combined with attributed influence and preference 
attainment to identify and measure US pressure on Japan. Drawing the concept of a 
reactive state model I will demonstrate how the United States pressured Japan against 
Japanese national interest. By focusing on the extent of Japanese sanctions, I put 
forward the case that Japan was able to implement low-key yet independent policy in 
case of sanctions. 
Keywords: US-Japan relations, Japan-Russia relations, foreign policy analysis, the 
Ukrainian crisis, sanctions, reactive state 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Japan-Russia relations have always been considered complicated due to frequently 
changing periods of diplomatic friendship, neutrality and military confrontation (Toḡō 
2010, 228). Today, both Japan’s Prime Minister Abe and Russia’s president Putin reach 
for a better diplomatic and economic relationship, yet the legacy of the World War II 
prevents the two states from fully realising successful cooperation. The problem lies in 
the disputed islands north of Hokkaido – the Southern Kurils or the Northern Territories 
– that keep the states from signing a peace treaty (Panov and Toḡō 2016, 17). In 2013, 
there was an ongoing debate over the possible territorial dispute resolution in both 
academic and political circles, when both Abe and Putin announced renewed 
negotiations on the latter. The hope for a breakthrough was nourished by optimistic 
statements of "hajime" (begin) and "hikiwake" (draw) in regards to negotiations made by 
Putin, but also by Abe’s hopefulness on finding the final solution to the conflict (Rozman 
29.04.2016). 
The breakthrough, however, never happened as the Japan-Russia relationship 
experienced a new low when Japan joined US economic sanctions against Russia due 
to the Russian involvement in the Ukrainian Crisis. The Ukrainian Crisis is referred to as 
the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine that started with the public protests (Euromaidan) 
against the Yanukovich government that resulted in February 2014 Revolution in Kyiv. 
The revolution evoked national unrest in Eastern and Southern Ukraine that led to the 
Crimean Referendum and the Civil War in the Donbass region. The international 
community strongly criticised Putin for supporting pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine by 
supporting them with goods and arms, yet Japan kept its position relatively neutral.  
The situation changed when Putin announced that the Crimean peninsula would be 
registered as two de facto Russian federal subjects — the Republic of Crimea and the 
City of Sevastopol (TASS 21.03.2014). Consequently, Japan showed solidarity with the 
United States and the European Union by imposing sanctions against Russia, despite 
the progress made the on the territorial dispute with Russia. Considering the strength of 
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Japanese sanctions, several experts emphasized that while Abe sanctioned Russia, he 
made it clear that Japan was willing “to keep the diplomatic door with Moscow open” 
(Rozman 29.04.2016). 
Japanese solidarity with the United States evoked a long-standing debate on the 
reactiveness of Japan’s foreign policy – the notion that Japan performs low-key risk 
avoiding diplomacy, solely reliant on the United States in foreign affairs (Mochizuki 
2007). In the case of Japanese sanctions, experts raised a question, whether the 
decision to impose sanctions against Russia while Japan-Russia relations experienced 
an important stage in territorial negotiations was independent or influenced by an 
external actor. This research focuses on US pressure on Japan to impose sanctions 
against Russia due to Russian involvement in the Ukrainian Crisis. The objective of this 
research is to analyse whether the United States influenced Japan’s decision to join US 
sanctions against Russia even though such policy was against Japanese interests. 
Therefore, this research will add to the discourse on the reactiveness of Japan’s foreign 
policy by answering the question whether Japan acted as a reactive state in relation to 
the Ukrainian Crisis and in following sanctions against Russia. For the purpose of this 
research I will use a process tracing method combined with attributed influence and 
preference attainment to identify and measure US pressure on Japan. Finally, analysis 
will show whether US pressure was successful and whether Japan is a reactive state. 
The research covers events from March 2014 to July 2016 and analyses three stages of 
sanctions in three chapters. The paper begins with the literature review on Japan’s 
foreign policy and Japan-Russia relations to provide a context to the issue of US 
pressure on Japan-Russia relations in regards to territorial dispute. Methodology 
explains the method of measuring external pressure and elaborates on theoretical 
approaches on Japan’s foreign policy-making process. Subsequently this research will 
compliment the discourse on Japan’s foreign policy-making process and US-Japan-
Russia relations. 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse if and how the United States influenced 
Japan to act accordingly to US references. By showing whether US pressure was 
effective, this research will complement the discourse on Japan’s foreign policy and 
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answer the questions whether Japan remains a reactive state. In light of global changes 
and the growing influence of Japan on the global arena, it is important to understand, 
how Japan acts in foreign affairs and whether it is able to implement independent 
policies that are not dependent on US preferences. The case of Japan-Russia relations 
in light of the Ukrainian Crisis provides a remarkable example, when the United States 
and Japan have different objectives. Therefore, this research will not only complement 
the discourse on US-Japan power relations, but also will be enlightening on Japan-
Russia relations in regards to the US-Russia deteriorating relationship. As a result, by 
knowing Japan’s behaviour in foreign affairs we might predict the future moves Japan 
will take to ensure its position on the global arena. 
1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM  
This thesis will present an analysis of US pressure on Japan’s foreign policy-making 
process. The central argument of this paper can be defined under two research 
questions: 
RQ1  Has US pressure on Japan resulted in reactive Japanese foreign policy – 
sanctions against Russia? 
RQ2  Is Japan a reactive state? 
To better address those questions, I use three arguments from hypothetical framework: 
HP1  US pressure has forced Japan to implement sanction policies against 
Russia. 
HP2  Japanese sanction policy against Russia is a reactive policy. 
HP2  Japan is a reactive state. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In today’s fast-changing world Japan is one of the most influential economic powers in 
the region, yet Japan’s foreign diplomacy remains low-key and risk-avoiding compared 
to the other developed countries. Japanese passivity in foreign affairs is widely 
considered to be a result of Japanese inability to perform independent foreign policy, 
which makes it merely rely on its major strategic ally – the United States (Mochizuki 
2007, 17). Scholars, who thoughtfully analysed the reasons and consequences of 
Japan’s dependence on US lead in foreign affairs, have emphasised the issue of 
gaiatsu (external pressure) in Japan’s foreign policy-making process1. While the debate 
on US pressure on Japan’s foreign policy-making process is ongoing, the case of 
Japanese sanctions against Russia has never been studied in this context. 
Whereas Japan-Russia relations are considered to be difficult, the US factor adds to the 
complexity between the two states. Today, US pressure on Japan in case of sanctions 
challenged the progress Abe and Putin made before 2014 on territorial dispute – the 
issue that was closely interconnected with the United States. 
Initially, the dispute over the sovereignty of the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories has 
been the keystone of Japan-Russia relations for 60 years. A number of studies agree 
that the mutual distrust is rooted in the events of World War II, when the Soviet Union 
violated the Pact of Neutrality and entered the war against Japan (Miyashita 2003, 108). 
There is a clear division in the literature between two perspectives of the historic and 
legal grounds to the Kuril Islands. The Pro-Russian stance is based on the result of 
Yalta Agreement – the document signed by the leaders of the United States, Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union on 11 February 1945 (Tōgo ̄2010, 228). According to the 
Yalta agreement, Japan was revoked from its legal rights to the southern part of the 
Sakhalin Island along with the Kuril Islands after the end of World War II. The territories 
were passed to the Soviet Union as a payment for a ‘self-sacrifice’ in helping its allies in 
liberating Asia from Japanese aggression (Hasegawa 1998, 72; Koshkin 2003, 230). 
                                            
1 The notion of gaitsu is further explained in methodology chapter 
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The Japanese position, supported both by Japanese and Western scholars, refuses to 
recognise the Yalta Agreement and its results (Kimura 2008; Rees 1985). Instead, 
Japan bases its claims on the Potsdam Declaration, which demanded that Japan return 
territories acquired by force after the Meiji Restoration, and which did not specifically 
clarify the future of the Kuril Islands (Toḡō 2010, 229). During the Cold War both 
positions existed with little changes, since both Japanese and Russian academic circles 
tended to ignore each other’s arguments and “elevate their own country’s claims and 
achievements at the expense of the other’s” (Stephan 1974, 1). 
The US factor in the dispute is repeatedly highlighted by scholars due to its direct 
involvement and unquestionable interest. Russian scholar Koshkin argued: “the 
Americans made us and the Japanese hostages of the tangled Kuril problem” (Brown 
2016, 21). Indeed, Washington clearly supported Russian incorporation of the disputed 
islands by agreeing to the Soviet conditions to join the Pacific War against Japan. Yet, 
the Cold War marked the shift of the United States’ position: it was more important for 
the United States to ensure Japan’s alliance rather than to keep its initial stance. The 
United States supported Japan in the deliberately vague San Francisco Peace Treaty, 
yet it was never signed by the Soviet Union, and the question of peace restoration and 
territorial dispute resolution was left open (Toḡo ̄2010, 232). Hasegawa argues that 
such development was in favour of the United States, since it prevented the Japan-
Russia rapprochement and “helped redirect Japanese anger about territorial losses 
away from Okinawa” to the Kuril Islands (Brown 2016, 20). Moreover, the Japan-Russia 
effort to negotiate over two islands in 1956 collapsed under the “Dulles intimidation” – 
the threat that the United States will never leave Okinawa if Japan drops its claims on 
the Kuril Islands (ibid. 21). It is argued that the Japan-Russia alliance would be a threat 
for US dominance in Pacific region, thus the territorial dispute is essential in keeping 
these two countries from cooperation (LaCaze 1992, 93-94). 
The end of the Cold War marked a new stage in Japan-Russia relations. In the early 
90s Russia experienced turmoil in domestic politics, which also affected the territorial 
dispute with Japan.  Despite various attempts of Liberals and Democrats to return all 
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four islands as a sign of goodwill, Communists and Nationalists – the dominant power in 
the Russian Duma – blocked such policy (Buszynski 2000, 407). 
The next serious possibility for dispute resolution occurred during the first term of 
President Putin. The Irkutsk summit of 2001 presented a new “two plus alpha” 
framework, which was developed from yontou ikkatsu henkan-ron2, and suggested that 
the islands could be returned in different stages - Habomai and Shikotan first, Iturup and 
Kunashir later (Rozman 2016, 6). Although MOFA (2011) states that Japan is willing to 
“respond flexibly to the timing and manner of their actual return”, in fact, such an 
approach was highly criticised by Japanese conservatives and foreign ministry officials 
along with Russian officials (Brown 2016, 2). Therefore, neither the Koizumi 
administration, nor Putin accepted “two plus alpha” as a conclusive framework in the 
beginning of the 2000s (Rozman 2016, 7). 
After 10 years of stagnation Abe focused on the restoration of Japan-Russia relations in 
order to continue the “two plus alpha” negotiations (Tōgo ̄2012). Today the literature on 
Japan-Russia relations focuses on different factors that might have pushed the Abe 
administration to seek a closer relationship with Russia. Firstly, the geopolitical factor of 
rising China is perceived to be crucial for Japan, thus it was repeatedly discussed in 
Japanese media and in academic publications (Buszynski 2000, 408; Green 2001, 33). 
While Russian opposition to the West brings it closer to China, Japanese strategic 
interest is to prevent such a situation from happening (Drennan 2015). Secondly, 
prospects of bilateral economic relationship, which remained undeveloped for decades, 
became positive, particularly towards crude exports and Russia-Japan investment 
cooperation (Ershova 2014, 14). Lastly, there is a recreation of a strong national identity 
registered both in Russia and Japan. Although national identity is usually referred as 
one of the obstacles in the dispute, Tōgo ̄argues that it will bring states closer (Rozman 
2016, 7-8). While Japan burdens the consequences of World War II, Abe is determined 
to resolve the post-War territorial conflicts in order to restore Japan’s sovereignty, which 
will eventually lead to the national identity restoration. Similarly, Putin is interested in 
                                            
2 The notion that all four islands should be returned together (Brown 2016) 
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better relationships in the East, including Japan, since it supports his argument of 
Russians being both Westerners and Easterners (ibid. 8).  
While Togo’s positive approach is creditable, it seems unlikely that the national identity 
factor will be sufficient enough to urge leaders to compromise. Although similar interest 
in national identity restoration might be a connecting point for Abe and Putin on 
personal level, diplomatically it will have little effect. Similarly, there is little to suggest 
that geopolitical factor will be crucial for either Putin or Abe in terms of negotiations on 
the territorial dispute. The issue of rising China brings little threat to the Putin 
Administration, whereas the Kuril Islands have strategically important location. As for 
Abe, the alliance with the United States is more beneficial in terms of security than 
rapprochement with Russia. Therefore, although Drennan’s and Toḡō’s arguments are 
sufficient for Japan-Russia relationship’s improvement in general, they have little 
importance for either Putin or Abe to compromise their initial stance on the dispute. 
By 2014 there was a growing hope in academic circles for possible breakthrough in the 
territorial dispute. Rozman (2002, 354) argued: “an unprecedented number of 
preconditions are at last in place for the leaders of Japan and Russia to reach an 
agreement, but more are needed.” Although scholars usually agree that it is a long way 
for a solution, they tend to disagree on the factors that will lead to the conflict resolution. 
Some argue that economic development between two states will play a pivotal role in 
territorial dispute resolution (Scarlapino 2003, 82). Kapur (2012, 387) suggests that 
eventually Russia will return the Kuril Islands to Japan in return for Japan-Russia 
economic cooperation, which will be beneficial for the Russian economy. Yet he doubts 
that the solution will be based on the return of all four islands. According to Panov 
(1999, 29-31), the conflict resolution will be reached only after Japan and Russia 
improve the most important spheres of the relationship - economic and diplomatic 
cooperation along with cultural exchange – in order to remove mutual emotional distrust 
and the Cold War stereotypes. Initially, he argues, the start is to be the bilateral 
economic cooperation on Kuril Islands (ibid. 31). 
Nevertheless, emerging hope in academic circles was considerably shaken by the 
events of the Russian annexation of Crimea and following Japanese sanctions against 
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Russia. A major debate on Japan’s participation in the international economic sanctions 
against Russia, which were imposed after the Crimean declaration of independence and 
Russia’s annexation of the peninsula in 2014, continues to fuel academic discourse on 
Japan’s position in the international arena. The issue of Japanese sanctions was 
analysed by Japanese and international scholars, the main focus lying on the causes of 
the crisis and following effects on Japan-Russia relations. With regards to causes of the 
conflict, which resulted in Russian aggression and following sanctions, Western 
scholars agree on the geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West, particularly, 
the United States (Daiske Oberbäumer and Sakaki 2015, 2). NATO’s expansion to 
Russia’s border along with the enlargement of western dominance into the Russian 
traditional sphere of influence – Ukraine - was perceived as an open threat to the Putin 
administration (Voytolovsky 2015, 72). 
It is unclear the reason why Japan joined Western sanctions, especially in the period of 
improving the Japan-Russia relationship. Although the official version stresses 
Japanese dedication to democratic Western values, scholars tend to believe that it was 
US influence that made Japan impose sanctions. The literature on the causes for the 
Japanese response to Russian aggression is respectively less detailed and contains no 
thoughtful analysis. While it is generally assumed that Japan responded to US pressure 
and imposed sanctions against its national interest, I will analyse the whole process of 
Japanese sanctions with the focus on gaiatsu in order to fill the gap in the literature and 
to answer the questions why Japan imposed sanctions, and whether Japan acted 
reactively according to US preferences. 
By understanding Japanese sanctions against Russia as a response to US pressure, 
we can draw parallels between the case of 2014 economic sanctions and the case of 
Japanese financial aid to Russia in 1990s. Miyashita (2003, 115) argues that Japanese 
reactiveness in foreign affairs and responsiveness to US pressure were the reasons 
why Japan abandoned its long-standing Linkage Strategy. Linkage Strategy or Seikei 
Fukabun was a diplomatic move of inseparability of politics and economics in bilateral 
relations that Japan made in order to pressure Russia to return the Kuril Islands during 
the Cold War. Therefore, according to Linkage Strategy Japan refused to economically 
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assist Russia until territorial dispute was solved. Nevertheless, in 1993, Japan 
responded to US pressure and issued financial aid to Russia against its preferences 
even though there was no progress in the territorial dispute (ibid. 111). The current 
research will answer the question whether the case of Japanese reactiveness is valid 
now, and whether Japanese sanctions against Russia is a response to US pressure 
rather than a proactive policy. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. REACTIVE STATE AND EMERGING ACTIVISM 
There is a long-standing assumption that Japan’s foreign policy-making process is 
reactive, therefore Japan’s foreign policy occurs as a response to external pressure 
(gaiatsu) rather than national interest. The assumption is rooted in the events after the 
World War II, when Japan experienced drastic changes in foreign politics. Since the 
1950s, the Yoshida administration had made a high priority of economic and social 
recovery from World War II, yet payed little attention to foreign affairs (Mochizuki 2007, 
2). The “Yoshida Doctrine” introduced a low-key risk-avoiding diplomacy solely reliant 
on the United States for trade and security (Miyashita 2003). Consequently, it has 
marked the beginning of the discourse on Japan’s foreign policy strategy. Both 
academic and policy circles have addressed the issue of Japanese passive 
engagement in foreign affairs, but no unified view could be found.  
Initially, Japanese passivity was considered as a rationally planned strategy to pursue 
national interest. Simply put, Japan could focus on rebuilding its economic and 
diplomatic influence, while others, specifically the United States, took the lead in 
international affairs (Berger 2007, 263). Others, however, believed that Japanese 
passivity reflected the absence of Japan’s international agenda, thus Japan’s foreign 
policy was based on US preferences and gaiatsu rather than national interest (Hirose 
2007, 281; Miyashita 2003, 2).  
The notion of reactive state was introduced by Kent Calder, who argued that “the 
impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, and reaction prevails 
over strategy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the two come into conflict” 
(Calder 1988, 518). He stressed two criteria to define that the state is reactive: “(1) the 
state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it 
has the power and national incentives to do so, and (2) it responds to outside pressures 
for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely” (ibid. 519). 
Calder (1988, 528) argued that Japan is a reactive state that is unable to pursue 
proactive politics under external pressure due to its domestic political structure. Unlike 
countries with strong chief executives, such as the United States, Japan was limited by 
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“weak executive authority, factionalism in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, 
bureaucratic sectionalism, and Japanese unique electoral system” (Mochizuki 2007, 2-
3).  
Despite global changes that occurred after the 1990s and a seemingly more active 
position of Japan, Calder argued (2003, 605) that almost a decade later after the end of 
the Cold War Japan still performed reactively in foreign policy, whereas Japanese 
domestic political structure remained severely divided. Whereas Calder’s model was 
supported by many reactivists (Blakes, Hellmann, Lincoln), there were scholars who 
supported the idea of Japan being a reactive state, yet disagreeing on the reason. 
According to Miyashita (2003, 10), Japanese reactiveness is based on Japanese 
asymmetric dependence on the Unites States, rather than fragmented structure of 
policy-making process. While Japan remains dependant on US military and trade, the 
United States have the leverage to influence Japan, which remains receptive of such 
influence. Unlike Calder’s notion of Japan’s weak domestic political structure, 
Miyashita’s argument explains Japanese responsiveness to US pressure in particular. 
Whereas Calder’s model of a reactive state was effective during the Cold War, it does 
not provide a sufficient explanation or Japan’s reactive behaviour in 2010s. 
Other scholars empirically criticize the idea that reactive model can be still implemented 
to post-Cold War Japan. Both Maswood (2001, 134) and Green (2001, 31-2) believe 
that Japan’s growing role in global affairs reflects a shift towards proactive foreign 
policy, which is not solely dependent on US preferences anymore. Similarly, Yasumoto 
(1995, 42) argues that the Japanese government bases its foreign economic aid on the 
national interest rather than external pressure. In his book “The New Multilateralism in 
Japan's Foreign Policy” he writes that “Japanese multilateral diplomacy in the late 
1990s, through low-key, is not stagnant. We can still identify activism” (ibid. 145). 
According to Long, Japan’s contribution to international political and economic 
environment defines Japan as a more active international player, that is able to “set 
agendas, shape international norms, define Japan’s identity in the international system, 
and condition the international environment so as to shape other states’ preferences” 
(Miyashita and Sato 2001, 130). 
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By analysing Japanese sanctions against Russia through the reactivist model this 
research emphasizes the importance of gaiatsu in Japan’s foreign policy and 
complements the discourse on Japan’s policy-making process. This research suggests 
that Japanese sanctions against Russia are an example of reactive acts, when the 
United States pressured Japan to implement policy that stands against Japanese 
national interest. Whereas there are a number of potential reasons for Japan to impose 
sanctions, the US pressure is considered to play the crucial role in the final decision. 
Based on my research of a number of documents there is little to suggest that domestic 
factors, such as different political groups, particularly the right-wing nationalists, or the 
public opinion had influenced Abe’s decisions in case of sanctions. Moreover, in case of 
gaiatsu, the United States, unlike other external actors, has both the ability and the will 
to influence Japan’s foreign policy. 
3.2. HOW TO UNDERSTAND US PRESSURE ON JAPAN 
To understand US pressure on Japan we must first understand the concept of power in 
international relations. Scholars, named Guzzini, Lukes and Morriss, argue that “power 
is not a material capacity, but rather rests on the production of effects” (O’Shea 2014, 
439). There are four “faces of power” created by conceptualists to identify the effects of 
power in international affairs. The first face of power has the same meaning as a 
gaiatsu and represents the ability of A (in case of this research - the United States) to 
pressure B (Japan) “to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957, 203; 
Miyashita 2003, 41). According to Barnett and Duvall, who catalogued faces of power 
through social relations, the first face of power is a compulsory power that represents 
direct interaction between A and B (O’Shea 2014, 440). Indirect interaction of the 
second face or the institutional power represents the ability of A to limit B in the scope of 
options in order to get the desired outcome. Furthermore, the third face of power 
(structural power) emphasizes on the way “how A can influence B’s interests”, whereas 
fourth (productive power) focuses on “how both A and B are constituted as subjects” 
(ibid 439).  
For the purpose of this research I focus on the first face of power or compulsory power. 
Essentially, the United States gets Japan to do something that Japan would not 
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otherwise do by creating a narrative/discourse that prioritises the US-Japan alliance 
above Japanese immediate national interest. In other words, in this narrative Japan 
would not be able to exist without its alliance with the United States that ensures 
Japanese security and economic prosperity (Miyashita 2003, 22). By creating such 
narrative, the United States is using discursive power to directly pressure Japan’s 
foreign policy-making process in order to reach desired policy (O’Shea 2014, 441). 
Simply put, in case of needed policy shift, the United States “warns” Japan about 
external security threats that Japan would not be able to face alone, and reminds it of 
the importance of the US-Japan alliance. The pressure is based on the assumption that 
Japan needs the alliance much more than the United States, therefore it should adapt 
its policies to the US preferences – this notion is the base of Miyashita argument on 
Japan’s reactive behaviour in foreign affairs.  
3.3. HOW TO IDENTIFY AND MEASURE US PRESSURE? 
The question of how to measure the influence is difficult to answer, even though it is 
one of the most important questions in political analysis (Dür 2008, 559). According to 
March (1955: 434) “there is lacking not only an immediately obvious unit of 
measurement, but even a generally feasible means of providing simple rankings.” 
Consequently, Dür (2008, 561) argues that there are three major difficulties with 
influence measurement. Firstly, there are different channels of influence, such as direct 
lobbying of policy-makers and outside lobbying focused on public opinion. Secondly, the 
counteractive lobbying might undermine the influence of another factor, thus it is difficult 
to measure the amount of influence each of them had. Lastly, the policy-making process 
can experience external pressure at different stages of the process, where influence 
imposed on the agenda-setting stage might come unnoticed unlike the influence 
imposed on the final decision-making stage or implementation stage (Dür 2008, 561). 
To measure US pressure on Japan in case of sanctions I focus on the influence coming 
from the public statements of the Obama Administration. Little attention is paid to US 
lobbying and Russian counteractive lobbying activities, since there is little information 
on that account. Analysts agree that Russian lobbying in Japan is weak and almost non-
existent, whereas US lobbying historically held a strong position in Japanese affairs 
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(Panov 2014).  Moreover, while I use the reactivist model as the main framework, I do 
not emphasise the influence of the domestic political structure on the policy-making 
process. Unlike Calder’s view that Japanese reactiveness is a result of internal conflicts 
and inefficient bureaucracy, I focus on Miyashita’s explanation of asymmetric 
dependence between Japan and the United States as the main reason for reactive state 
behaviour in the case of sanctions. 
In order to measure the US pressure on Japan’s foreign policy-making process I use the 
process-tracing method – one of the major methodological approaches to measure 
influence (Dür 2008, 559). Process tracing provides an adequate analysis of the causal 
sequence by “drawing descriptive and causal interferences from diagnostic pieces of 
evidence” (Collier 2011, 824). Collier highlights that careful description of each 
significant step of the process is important in order to understand what caused the 
outcome. Such steps include the identification of actors involved, preferences of these 
actors, attempts actors made in order to impose their preferences, and the reaction of 
the decision-makers on such interference (ibid. 824). Finally, research focuses on “the 
degree to which groups’ preferences are reflected in outcomes and groups’ statements 
of (dis-)satisfaction with the outcome” (Dür 2008, 562). 
In this research I analyse major steps Japan took in regards of sanctions against Russia 
between March 2014 and July 2016 in order to firstly identify and measure the US 
pressure, and secondly analyse whether it was successful. In order to measure 
pressure, we have to identify it first, thus we analyse the outcome – sanctions - through 
the lens of whether the outcome reflects preference of Japan or the United States, and 
compare the original outcome with the ideal preferences of the actors. Such approach is 
called preference attainment, and it is used to detect the pressure in cases when 
“nothing visible happens, for example because all lobbying is secret or because 
structural power is at work” (ibid. 566-567). Preference attainment in combination with 
attributed influence, which is based on how experts perceive the situation of power 
relations in this case, helps us to identify and measure US pressure on Japan in case of 
sanctions. 
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As it was mentioned, this paper focuses on the compulsory power that reflects direct 
interaction between Japan and the United States. Therefore, I focus on official 
statements of the Obama Administration found in the State Department’s press releases 
and media to identify whether there was any direct or indirect pressure on Japan. By 
direct pressure we should understand statements that clearly assert US opposition to 
Japanese position and that criticise Japanese actions. Indirect pressure is harder to 
identify, although it is generally presented through the discursive power of the narrative 
on the importance of US-Japan alliance. In the case of unwanted Japanese actions, the 
United States intensifies the discourse on external threats to Japan that will further 
require US involvement to protect Japan. 
Finally, in order to answer the question, whether Japan is reactive, this research 
focuses on the outcome of US pressure. Simply put, I will identify what attempts the 
United States took to make Japan act in the line with US preferences, and then analyse 
whether those attempts were successful. First of all, this paper will compare sanctions 
imposed by the United States and the European Union with the measures taken by 
Japan. Furthermore, the research will focus on Abe’s personal approach to improve 
Japan-Russia relations despite sanctions and US criticism. By doing so, this research 
paper will draw a conclusion on the reactiveness of Japan in relation to sanctions. 
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4. THE 1st ROUND OF SANCTIONS 
Sanctions against Russia were introduced by the United States and the European 
Union in response to the Russian military intervention in Ukraine “as well as the 
authorisation given by the Federation Council of Russia on 1 March for the use of the 
Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine" (European Council 03.03.2014). On 
March 6, US President Obama assigned sanctions against actors “who have asserted 
governmental authority in the Crimean region without the authorization of the 
Government of Ukraine” (Exec. Order No. 13660). Particularly, the United States 
terminated its cooperation with Russia in economic and military spheres to send a 
signal to Russia, that the United States will not ignore Russian actions in Ukraine 
(Kitade 2016, 3). Similarly, on the same day, the EU leaders confirmed the suspension 
of “bilateral talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters and on the New 
Agreement” as well as the EU-Russia summit meetings cancellation (European Council 
06.03.2014). However, it was not until the referendum in the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea, when Japan joined western sanctions. 
Initially, Japan faced a complicated situation, when it was forced to compromise 
between its two different agendas. On the one hand, Abe was reluctant to compromise 
his progress with Putin on the territorial dispute. By 2014, Japan-Russia relations have 
reached its best state since 2001, when the renewal of the dialogue on the Kuril Islands 
was made possible by improving economic and diplomatic relationship between Russia 
and Japan (Rozman 29.04.2016). However, Japan’s open support of western sanctions 
would send a mixed message to Russia and imperil the future of the Kuril’s 
negotiations. 
On the other hand, for many decades the United States has played a crucial role in 
Japan’s foreign affairs, therefore Japan was hesitant to act unfavourably to the United 
States. In the case of sanctions against Russia, the United States has insisted that only 
a unified response of the international community will be enough to pressure Russia to 
abandon its aggressive behaviour towards Ukraine. Subsequently, Russian economic 
and diplomatic isolation will pressure Russia to concede and accept the results of the 
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Maidan Revolution (Psaki 18.03.2014). Hence, Japan as a member of G7 was expected 
to act in accordance to democratic values and join sanctions against Russia. 
Prior to March 2014, there is no indication of direct or indirect US pressure on Japan: 
US narrative on sanctions did not include Japan, but mostly focused on US and EU 
measures. Therefore, while Japan expressed its concerns about growing violence 
during the Ukrainian Crisis, no practical measures had been taken, nor was there an 
open criticism of Putin’s actions. 
The deterioration of the Ukrainian Crisis and announcement of the Crimean referendum, 
however, marked the beginning of US pressure on Japan to impose sanctions. On 
March 17, a US spokesperson stated that while the United States and the European 
Union have already announced their sanctions against Russia, Asian countries will also 
make an independent decision according to their international responsibility (Psaki 
17.03.2014).  
The US pressure on Japan has been imposed in indirect form by using a discursive 
power of narrative that emphasized the importance of the US-Japan alliance for Japan. 
In this narrative, the United States plays a pivotal role that is essential for Japanese 
security and economic prosperity. According to Miyashita (2003, 22), Japan’s 
asymmetric dependency on the Unites States to protect Japanese sovereignty from 
military intervention makes Japan receptive to the US pressure. Therefore, the growing 
threat to Japanese security was used as a pressuring point to make “Japan act the way 
that it would not otherwise act” – the compulsory power that the United States has over 
Japan (ibid. 41). 
Whereas, there were no public remarks that the United States was pushing Japan to 
impose sanctions, the analysis based on my analysis of daily press releases of March 
2014 reveals that the United States and Japan were in close coordination about the 
North Korean threat. Moreover, Japan’s concerns about China’s increase of military 
budget in 2014 were substantial. In light of recent developments in North Korea and 
China, Japan’s dependence on the United States for security was emphasised by US 
officials throughout March 2014. 
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The dialogue between Japan and the United States had intensified when Crimea 
announced its preparations to conduct a referendum. Whereas Japan was not 
interested in pressuring Russia, it was highly concerned about protecting the 
sovereignty of the state, due to its own unresolved territorial disputes: the Northern 
Territories with Russia, the Senkaku Islands with China and Takeshima with Korea - the 
legacy of WWII (Panov 2016, 35; Tōgo ̄8.05.2012). China’s military budget increase in 
2014 was perceived in Japan as a threat, and urged Japan to seek closer cooperation 
with the United States. In the event of Chinese aggression in the Senkaku Islands, 
Japan will require US protection, therefore, it was essential for Japan to show its 
solidarity with the United States.  
Initially, the referendum of Crimea was perceived as a Russian military intervention, 
therefore Japan expressed its concerns that “US lack of resolve in preventing the 
annexation [of Crimea] would mean that a Chinese seizure of the Senkaku Islands 
would be met with similar weakness” (Rozman 29.04.2016). In response, US Defence 
Secretary Chuck Hagel reassured Japan that Japanese security is a priority in the US-
Japan alliance, therefore the United States will protect Japan against any external threat 
(Cooper and Fackler 2014). Hence, we can identify the growing influence of the United 
States on Japan by using the Crimean Referendum as an example of illegal occupation 
of sovereign state’s land and highlighting the importance of the US-Japan security 
alliance.  
US indirect pressure on Japan was successful in the first round of sanctions, since 
Japan, despite its interest in maintaining good relationship with Russia, joined US 
sanctions. Japanese sanctions were introduced on March 18 as part of the G7 
response, and included “suspension of consultation for easing visa regulations as well 
as freeze of launching negotiations of a new investment agreement, an outer space 
cooperation agreement and an agreement for prevention of dangerous military 
activities” (MOFA 18.03.2014).  
Nevertheless, Abe did not intend to damage the growing relationship with Putin, which 
was illustrated in the extent of Japanese sanctions against Russia. To keep the 
diplomatic door with Moscow open, Abe avoided direct criticism of Putin’s actions, 
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moreover the Japanese response to annexation of Crimea was the mildest among all 
G7 members. Unlike the US and EU sanctions that targeted diplomatic and economic 
cooperation with Russia, Japanese sanctions neither caused harm to Russian 
economy, nor did they sufficiently damage Japan-Russia relations (Kitade 2016, 3; 
Panov 4.09.2014). Abe’s intention was to send a signal that Japan stands with the 
United States against illegal annexation of Crimea, yet creating no serious 
complications for the future of Japan-Russia relations. By doing so Japan reached three 
goals: firstly, Japan supported its alliance with the United States, secondly, it kept its 
international image of democracy advocate, thirdly, mild sanctions allowed Japan to 
keep the diplomatic dialogue with Russia (Panov 4.09.2014). 
4.1. RESULTS 
The analysis based on the first round of sanctions reveals that US pressure on Japan 
forced the Abe administration to join US/EU sanction policy against Russia even though 
it was against Japan’s national interest. US influence on Japan was imposed in the form 
of indirect pressure by creating a narrative in which Japan has to rely on the United 
States to protect its sovereign land from external threats, specifically North Korea and 
China. US pressure was effective due to Japan’s asymmetric dependence on the United 
States for security, therefore I argue that the first round of Japanese sanctions is a 
response to US pressure. Yet the extent of Japanese sanctions suggests that Japan is 
not a reactive state: weak sanctions were imposed to reach three goals that 
represented Japan’s national interest. Therefore we can identify activism in the policy of 
manoeuvring between US pressure and national interest. 
  
23 
 
5. THE 2nd ROUND OF SANCTIONS 
Despite the international response to Russian actions, the situation in Ukraine had not 
improved, but rather deteriorated. The second round of sanctions was introduced on the 
basis of Russia’s constant involvement to the crisis that violated the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine (MOFA 29.04.2014). The United States urged the 
international community to take more effective measures in order to counter Russian 
‘Cold War tactics’, thus from March 16 the United States started restricting visas and 
freezing assets of Russian and Crimean officials and companies that were linked to 
Vladimir Putin, targeting in total 104 individuals and 55 organisations (Kitade, 2016, 3; 
Tsvetkova, 2014). Similarly, the European Union restricted visas and froze assets of 
146 individuals and 37 organisations (Kitade 2016, 3).  
Japanese measures of the second round were introduced as part of the G7 response a 
month later, on April 29, and similarly to the first round, they were considerably weaker 
on scale: only 23 individuals were restricted from visas (MOFA 29.04.2014). Unlike 
other G7 states, Japan intentionally did not announce the names of people targeted by 
sanctions, neither did Japan freeze the assets of these individuals (Kitade 2016, 2). 
Moreover, Japanese authorities confirmed that some individuals targeted by the US and 
EU sanctions, such as Naryshkin or Sechin – people from Putin’s inner circle, were not 
targeted by the Japanese sanctions (Moshkin 2015).  
By looking at US pressure on Japan from an attributed influence respective, we can see 
that many scholars argued that the second round of sanctions was imposed on Japan 
by the United States. Russian analyst Kunadze argued that it was US pressure that 
forced Japan to engage in the new round of sanctions, which came right after Japanese 
diplomats visited Washington (Galperovich 2015). Similarly, Rozman (29.04.2016) 
highlighted the presence of US influence on Japan to intensify sanctions against 
Russia, since the previous measures were ineffective.  
Furthermore, we can also identify indirect US pressure on Japan. Since the first round 
of Japanese sanctions the narrative of the importance of the US-Japan security alliance 
has further intensified: in every Obama statement on the US-Japan coordination about 
the Ukrainian Crisis and the importance of the unified international response to it, the 
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topic of Chinese and North Korean threat came forward. For example, a week before 
the second round, Obama visited Tokyo for the Japan Summit 2014, and the discussion 
on the Ukrainian Crisis and insufficient measures against it was on the table (Sieg and 
Brunnstrom 2014). The US-Japan Joint Statement emphasised the successful 
cooperation between the United States and Japan in economic and security spheres, 
whereas both states had to oppose to the external threat coming from China and North 
Korea. The United States also assured that it will continue to cooperate with Japan to 
guarantee Japanese security, and highlighted the united stance of the states on the 
sanctions against Russia (The White House 25.04.2014). 
Consequently, the US pressure was effective, since Japan responded to it and joined 
the second round of sanctions, which allows us to believe that Japan’s foreign policy-
making process in case of sanctions was reactive. Taking into consideration that a 
reactive state acts against its national interest in response to external pressure, Japan, 
due to its asymmetric dependence on the United States for security (Miyashita 2003, 
10), had no other choice, but to agree to US foreign policy and implement its own 
accordingly, even when it has a different agenda. 
Yet, the extent of Japanese measures against Russia in the first round and the 
beginning of the second round suggests that Abe was reluctant to impose sanctions, 
neither had he aimed to harm emerging Japan-Russia relations. Abe’s primary intention 
towards Russia was to restore the economic and diplomatic relations between the two 
states and to resolve a territorial conflict, thus sanctioning policy contradicted Abe’s 
primary intentions (Chen 21.09.2016). Consequently, Japan acted “in a way that Japan 
would not otherwise act” (Miyashita 2003, 41), due to its inability to secure its own lands 
in the case of Chinese aggression without the United States, hence Japan had to ignore 
its own agenda with Russia for a good relationship with its major ally. 
As a result of Japanese weak sanctions, whereas keeping diplomatic relations with 
Russia, US narrative on sanctions against Russia changed from US/EU collaboration 
into G7 united framework. In the G7 Brussels meeting on 4-5 June, Obama highlighted 
the importance of a unified stance and assured that all G7 members have the same 
intentions against Russia (The White house 05.06.2014). 
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The change in the US narrative also indicates the doubts Obama had about the 
Japanese agenda: Japanese measures against Russia were the mildest among other 
G7 members’ sanctions. Furthermore, given that Abe was determined to continue 
diplomatic dialogue with Russia, it was logical to suggest that Japan was the weakest 
link in Western measures against Russia, and that Putin might use it to split G7 unity 
over sanctions policy (Rozman 29.04.2016).  
Moreover, after Abe’s presentation of the final report on the revision of the constitution 
in May 2014, some US officials were worried that Abe’s pursuing of actions to restore 
Japanese rights for self-defence might change the core of US-Japan relationship, 
whereas Japan will play a larger role in the alliance (Mie 15.05.2014). In light of a 
successful revision of Article 9, Japan will no longer be asymmetrically dependant on 
the United States for security – one of the main factors for Japanese reactiveness 
according to Miyashita. Instead, Japan will be able to implement more independent 
foreign policy, which suggests, that the United States might lose Japanese support in 
several foreign campaigns (including Russia) if Japan finds them inadequate for its 
national interest (Blair 3.07.2014). 
Thus Obama needed a reassurance that Japan-Russia rapprochement on the basis of 
the territorial dispute negotiations will not encourage Japan to lift sanctions. As a result, 
Japanese weak April sanctions marked a shift from US indirect pressure to direct 
pressure. 
On July 5, US Assistant Secretary of State Danny Russell expressed the US 
government’s concerns over Abe’s political developments, specifically highlighting the 
issue of inadequately soft sanctions imposed by Japan. In his interview to the Asahi 
Shimbun, Russell expressed US disappointment over Japanese reconciliation with 
Russia, and simply put, said “how disappointed the U.S. will be if Japan betrays its ally” 
(Jannuzi 2016, 94). Russell’s statement contains strong and direct pressure on Japan to 
change its policy towards Russia by threatening Japan to come to terms with the 
consequences of the US-Japan security alliance termination. Whereas the indirect 
pressure was based on the narrative of the North Korean and Chinese threat in general, 
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the direct pressure was meant to remind Japan that it would not be able to secure its 
sovereign lands, the Senkaku Islands in particular, without US help. 
Moreover, Obama in his speech after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 
expressed his concerns that the core of the sanctions lies on the United States and the 
European Union (The White House 29.07.2014). He made it obvious that weak 
measures will not be effective, thus states have to response in unified manner despite 
the difficulties.  
The US direct pressure was effective in making Japan shift from signalling sanctions 
into substantial sanctions. Japanese dependence on US security pushed it to act 
reactively towards the United States and to intensify sanctions despite its preferences. 
On July 28 Japan froze assets of individuals involved in the destabilisation in Eastern 
Ukraine (MOFA 28.07.2014) and sanctioned companies that operated in key sectors of 
the Russian economy (MOFA 31.07.2014). Moreover, on August 5, MOFA (5.08.2014) 
announced restrictions on payment and capital transactions for 40 individual and two 
companies in Crimea. Although Japanese sanctions were still milder than the US 
measures, we can see that it was enough for the United States at this stage: Obama’s 
statement on sanctions changed from being solely US/EU measures into international 
actions taken to protect democracy (The White House 28.08.2014). 
5.1. RESULTS 
Due to inefficiency of the first round of sanctions the United States intensified its 
pressure on Japan. The second round of sanctions was implemented under US 
pressure, which shifted from being indirect and mild, into direct pressure that used 
Japanese asymmetric dependence on the United States for security as a threatening 
tool. The US direct pressure was efficient in order to urge Japan to shift towards 
substantial sanctions in the second round. 
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6. THE 3rd ROUND OF SANCTIONS 
In September 2014, prior to the third round of sanctions Japan and the United States 
were in the middle of the discussion on the planned revision to Japan-US Defence 
Cooperation Guidelines. The discussion also included informal talks on the Japanese 
military capability in light of Chinese geopolitical development in Asia in addition to the 
North Korean threat (Kubo 2014). My analysis based on the US statements in that 
period reveals that US narrative on the external threat to Japan has been consistent. 
The United States continued to emphasize the importance of the US-Japan alliance and 
the role the unity plays in this alliance. Therefore, we can identify the indirect pressure 
on Japan to be constant and efficient. 
Japan joined the third round of sanctions on 25 September by putting restrictions on 
export of arms to Russia and prohibited several Russian banks from issuing their 
securities in Japan (MOFA 25.09.2014). Yet, compared to the US sanctions on defence 
and related material sector of the Russian Federation economy (OFAC 2016, 3) and to 
the EU measures against Russian state-owned banks, defence companies and three 
major energy companies (European Council 11.09.2014), Japanese sanctions were 
noticeably insufficient and somewhat lacking. Japan’s restriction on the exportation of 
arms was symbolic, since there was no export of arms in general. Similarly, sanctions 
only affected the reputation of the listed banks with no economic harm, since no 
maturity date was imposed on those banks (Galperovich 2015). 
Japanese refusal to impose stronger sanctions despite ongoing US pressure indicates a 
stronger proactive position gained after the second round of sanctions. If we look at the 
preference attainment, we can recognise the shift in Japanese preferences going closer 
to repairing the damage Japanese sanctions made to Japan-Russia relations. As a 
result of the second round, Russia refused to continue the dialogue on the territorial 
dispute and increased its military presence in the Kuril Islands (Rozman 29.04.2016). 
Russian Military drills in the Kuril Islands and the Kuril visit of the Chief of the Russian 
Presidential Staff Sergei Ivanov, were followed by the ban of certain Japanese officials 
to enter Russia (Drennan 2015).  
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While Russia demonstrated its potential to terminate the Kuril’s negotiations, Japan 
became more verbal in opposition to the US lead in case of sanctions. The former 
Japanese PM Yoshirō Mori, who met Putin in September 2014, argued that Abe had 
little intention to damage Japan-Russia relations and that “the gap between US and 
Japanese geopolitical reasoning was at a peak not seen in post-Cold War decades” 
(Rozman 29.04.2016). Moreover, there were several statements from Japanese officials 
that Tokyo was pressured to join the sanction policy (ibid.). Tokyo Governor Yoichi 
Masuzō argued that Tokyo is willing to improve Japan-Russia relations despite 
Japanese collaboration with the United States in Russian sanction policy. He also urged 
Russians to understand that the Japanese need to “rely on the US military potential” in 
light of Chinese and North Korean threats (TASS 4.09.2014). 
Clearly, Abe’s message to Moscow had been heard. Despite sanctions, Abe kept 
diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia open by adding a personal touch to it. 
After a series of phone calls, Abe and Putin met in person on the ASEM summit on 17 
October. As a result of this meeting, both Russian and Japanese officials hinted that 
talks on territorial dispute were back on the table (Rozman 29.04.2016) To add to this, 
the next time Putin and Abe met at the Beijing ATEC summit they confirmed Putin’s visit 
to Japan (Embassy of Japan in Russia 10.11.2014).  
In light of these events US pressure on Japan remained indirect, yet constant. The 
narrative on the external threat to the US-Japan alliance changed by becoming more 
aggressive towards Russia. The US Department of Defence (12.11.2014; 15.11.2014) 
repeatedly argued that there is a growing military threat coming from China and Russia 
that is dangerous for both the Unites States and US allies. Consequently, on December 
9, Japan officially added 26 individuals and 14 entities to the list of asset freeze 
measures (MOFA 09.12.2014). Sanctions were intensified after the series of joint 
events between the United States and Japan focused on the US-Japan defence 
cooperation (Takenaka 2014). 
The December sanctions were the last Japanese measures in response to the situation 
in Ukraine, and also the last reactive policy Japan implemented under US pressure. It is 
also worth mentioning that sanctions targeted people from Crimea and the city of 
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Sevastopol and consequently brought no harm to Russian economy. While it is obvious 
that Japan’s measures were influenced by the US pressure, the extent of the measures 
suggests that Japanese responsiveness to the pressure was not as strong. While a 
reactive state fails to make independent choices and “responds to outside pressures [...] 
erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely” (Calder 1988, 519), Japanese 
sanctions demonstrated that Japan had the strength to partially respond to US pressure 
with cold logic that allowed Japan to keep good relations with both the United States 
and Russia. Whereas the Japanese decision to impose sanctions was a reactive policy, 
the US pressure was inefficient to force Japan to abandon its rapprochement with 
Russia. 
The year 2015 marked a shift towards a pro-active policy in Japanese actions towards 
Russia. To keep its international image, Abe did not lift existing sanctions against 
Russia, yet he intensified his attempts to restore good relations with Putin. Despite the 
diplomatic sanctions, the absence of sanctions or contra-sanctions in the energy sector 
allowed Abe to rapidly develop economic relations with Russia. In 2015 Russia became 
the fourth-biggest supplier of liquefied natural gas to Japan hitting the record of crude’s 
export since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Reurters 11.03, 2015). 
US attempts to pressure Japan into new round of sanctions failed. Abe’s statement on 
sanctions: “we have had a frank and candid exchange of views and we agreed that we 
would cooperate” (The White House 28.04.2015) after the meeting with Obama in April 
demonstrates that there was no longer a unified position on the issue. Moreover, the 
absence of Japanese measures against Russia as well as the confirmation on the 
renewal of the Kuril’s dialogue illustrated that Japan no longer responded to US indirect 
pressure (Kyodo 29.09.2015). US attempts to directly pressure Japan were also 
inefficient: US spokesperson Kirby’s fierce criticism of Japan-Russia rapprochement 
and “business as usual with Russia” had no effect on Japan’s foreign policy (U.S. 
Department of State 08.11.2015). 
Similarly, we can identify US indirect and direct pressure on Japan in the first half of 
2016, which was ineffective. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in May, Obama 
strongly criticised Russia and China for aggressive politics, suggesting that both states 
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are equally dangerous for the global order (US Department of State 26.05.2016). The 
importance of unity against Russia was once more ‘reminded’ to Japan by the State 
Department spokesman Clay in his email before the Ise-Shima G7 summit (Bloomberg 
Staff Report 2016). Nevertheless, there are no indicators that US attempts to persuade 
Japan to change its approach to Russia reached the goal. 
Earlier in the year, the United States attempted to pressure Japan when Obama 
requested Abe to postpone or cancel his Russia visit due to US-Russia confrontation 
over Ukraine and Syria (Kyodo 24.02.2016). The request was made in the context of 
Japan-US joint cooperation over the North Korean unsanctioned rocket launch, which 
suggests that Obama attempted to use Japanese dependence on US military as a 
persuading tool. Yet, Abe visited Sochi in May to confirm Putin’s Japan visit and assure 
that leaders are ready to continue talks over disputed territories (Bloomberg Staff 
Report 2016). Moreover, Japan was the first state to lift part of the sanctions, when 
Tokyo continued visa-talks with Moscow that were terminated in the first round of 
sanctions. As a result, there were no obstacles to Abe-Putin meeting in Yamaguchi, 
where the leaders engaged in two-days of talks on the territorial dispute and peace 
treaty (Mie 15.12.2016). 
6.1. RESULTS 
Under the constant US pressure Japan engaged in the new round of sanctions, yet the 
sanctions were rather signalling than substantial. Japanese sanctions did not cause 
significant harm to Russian economy, neither did they isolate Russia diplomatically. In 
the third round of sanctions Abe’s preferences changed into closer bilateral relationship 
between Russia and Japan, therefore the cooperation between these two states 
intensified. Despite the fact that the United States was using both direct and indirect 
pressure on Japan, the year 2015 marked a shift when US pressure became ineffective 
on Japan’s foreign policy-making process. 
7. CONCLUSION 
This research revealed that the United States pressured Japan to implement and to 
intensify sanctions against Russia. While Japan’s preference toward Russia was to 
improve bilateral relation and to renew the dialogue on the Kuril Islands dispute, the 
31 
 
United States urged Japan to terminate its economic and diplomatic relationship with 
Moscow due to the situation in Ukraine. The pressure was imposed in two ways: direct 
and indirect. The direct pressure was coming from the US officials who criticised Abe’s 
rapprochement with Russia despite the main idea of sanctions to economically and 
diplomatically isolate Russia. The indirect pressure was presented through the narrative 
on the US-Japan security alliance, which suggested that Japan would not be able to 
protect its sovereign land without US support in face of the threat coming from North 
Korea and China. Therefore, the United States used compulsory power to force Japan 
to implement sanctions against Russia despite Japan’s national interest to improve 
Japan-Russia relations. Japan’s asymmetric dependency on the United States for 
security made US pressure to be possible and effective. 
US pressure on Japan to impose sanctions was successful in the first two rounds of 
sanctions: although Japan was willing to continue negotiations on the territorial dispute, 
it joined US sanctions against Russia. The extent of Japanese measures was perceived 
as insufficient, therefore US pressure on Japan intensified. As a result, Japan joined the 
second round of sanctions several months later, which illustrates the effectiveness of 
US pressure to impose sanctions. However, the research demonstrates that Japanese 
responsiveness to US pressure is not absolute: Japan kept its sanctions mild and 
symbolic not to harm the Japan-Russia relationship. Moreover, while the negotiations 
on the dialogue about the territorial dispute evolved, Japanese foreign policy turned 
more proactive. The third round of sanctions demonstrated Japanese low-key but active 
policy towards Russia. Whereas Japan kept the US-Japan security cooperation 
ongoing, it did not respond to US pressure to terminate its relations with Russia. 
Moreover, since Japanese sanctions intentionally did not harm Russian economy, they 
had little practical effect.  
The research questions of this paper were: Has US pressure on Japan resulted in 
reactive Japanese foreign policy – sanctions against Russia? And is Japan a reactive 
state? To address these questions I base my answer on three hypotheses. HP1:  “US 
pressure has forced Japan to implement sanction policies against Russia” has proved to 
be right in all three stages of Japanese sanctions. Japanese sanctions were caused by 
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US pressure rather than national interest. HP2: “Japanese sanction policy against 
Russia is a reactive policy” has proved to be wrong. Although in the second round of 
sanctions Japan responded more reactively towards the Unite States, the further 
actions demonstrate Japan’s reluctance to act in accordance to US preferences. 
Japanese sanctions were a well calculated strategy of Abe to reach both Japan’s goals: 
to keep the US-Japan alliance strong as well as to improve Japan-Russia relations in 
order to continue the negotiations on the Kuril Islands. Therefore, I argue that Japanese 
sanctions were not a reactive policy, but rather an active and independent decision that 
compromised both US and Japan’s preferences, thus they demonstrated Japan’s ability 
to act independently. Finally, the HP3: “Is Japan a reactive state” is wrong, since the 
case of Japanese sanctions demonstrate that Japan was able to conduct independent 
and active policy even under the US pressure. 
As a result, on the basis of this research, I argue that that although US pressure 
resulted in Japanese sanctions against Russia, Japan should not be considered as a 
reactive state. The case of the sanctions against Russia demonstrates that gaiatsu does 
not identify Japan’s foreign policy-making process, therefore Japan is able of 
conducting low-key yet active foreign policy. 
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